As noted in our prior PrincipalAnalysis, A View To A Kill, one of the key Israeli objectives of Operation Cast Lead is to hit Hamas hard enough and through sustained air and ground operations in order to significantly degrade the Gaza terrorist group. The immediate objective is not the total IDF defeat of Hamas, but rather a step toward that long-term objective.

It is highly improbable that any Israeli war or operations can achieve the complete defeat of Hamas on their own. It is, after all, more than simply a terrorist group comprised of angry armed men. It is a movement, and one backed by a very influential and powerful Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, from which Hamas is the Palestinian offspring. Hamas is a terrorist group which, like Hizballah in southern and eastern Lebanon, claims its political legitimacy on the foundation of popular support which, in turn, is both the benefit and reason behind the existence of its provision of civil services and charity. Defeating Hamas as a popular movement requires more than dead terrorists and Israeli tanks. It quite necessarily requires an indigenous Palestinian alternative.

The Victory Must Be Palestinian

Just as the demise of al-Qaeda in Iraq required popular rejection and revolt by Iraqis, the ultimate demise of Hamas as a viable threat to Israel likewise requires a Palestinian Muslim victor, not a Jewish Israeli victor. With this - some Palestinian alternative - Hamas can not be defeated as a movement, and therefore Israeli war with it would be a continuous cycle of a growing terrorist movement; Israeli debilitating strikes; terrorist re-supply, resurgence and attacks; and more Israeli strikes. Lather. Rinse. Repeat.

Ideally, a new and moderate Palestinian alternative faction would emerge and take root. Many Palestinians see Hamas as instigators, bringing the heavy hand of Israeli retaliation and its associated misery. Likewise, many Palestinians also see Fatah as a hopelessly corrupt Arafat legacy of cronyism and graft. There is little realistic alternative for Palestinians. In the current absence of any political alternative, Israel likewise has few choices in securing its citizenry against terror attacks launched from the Hamas-dominated Gaza Strip.

Israel can withdraw and do nothing, accepting the threat and launch of Hamas' rockets into in-range Israeli towns and cities. This is an option, but an unacceptable one for any nation serious about protecting and defending its vulnerable citizenry.

Conversely, Israel can press on with ground operations in a largely sealed and cordoned Gaza Strip until Hamas has been bled dry. Three aspects of this approach make it untenable. The amount of Israeli blood, sacrifice and committed resources required to see this option through is too high for the relatively small Israeli population. Likewise, the required commitment of forces would raise Israel's exposure to and increase the risk of counter-attack from the ever-present threats on other borders, namely Iran's Hizballah foreign legion in Lebanon and Iran's neighboring ally, Bashar Assad's Syria. Thirdly, as noted above, even the complete defeat of Hamas militarily does not kill the radical group as a movement.

Without a Palestinian option in place for the Palestinian public in Gaza to consider and ideally choose, Hamas will remain alive even after the most decisive of operations, only to regroup, regenerate, and restore its dominance in Gaza and terror upon Israel.

Fatah: The Only Palestinian Option Today

Today, Fatah is the only option for both Palestinians and Israelis alike. While Gazans may loathe Fatah's long tradition of corruption and graft, and Israelis may be under no illusions that Fatah is an ideal partner, there simply is no other alternative. There may be down the road -
especially if Hamas can be dethroned in Gaza - but in order to get to that point, Fatah becomes the sole option of necessity.

The Palestinian president, Fatah's Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), still maintains a map of the region on the wall without the state of Israel included and a greater 'Palestine' covering the entire area. However, Israel has given Fatah, the least bad of two Palestinian political options, room to breathe and, potentially, moderate. Perhaps the motivation for Abbas' relative embrace of Israel stems from the many economic carrots afforded it after the 2006 elections that catapulted a more radical Hamas into power.

The Palestinian Authority, run by Fatah in the West Bank, is itself an international welfare-dependent government, and Abbas' popularity hinged early on the PA's ability or inability to make payroll for its thousands of employees. But whatever the motivation, the effects are undeniable. Israel has a Palestinian Authority that it can at least engage in discussion and negotiation. This is not the case with Hamas, nor will it likely ever be considering its founding charter remains centered on the destruction of the State of Israel and the subjugation, death or expulsion of Jews.

Egypt Also Favors Fatah In Gaza - For Now

Not only is Fatah currently Israel's preferred Palestinian partner, but it is also the faction favored by the Egyptian government. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is both powerful and influential, with branches and offshoots all over the world. But it is not the governing power in Egypt. That falls to the regime under an elderly Hosni Mubarak who, now at 83 years of age, has a long history of keeping the Muslim Brotherhood in check, often violently.

His age and increasing frailty should be sounding alarm bells in the West as it is certainly doing so in Israel. What comes after Hosni Mubarak's eventual death is predictable in only one aspect: almost certain instability and volatility in Egypt as the vying for absolute power among groups and powerful individuals would immediately commence. And with Mubarak's inevitable passing may come the end of a relatively internally stable, reliable Israeli neighbor, with whom the Israelis have been at peace for decades. This may be a factor contributing to Israel's sense of urgency in dealing a crippling blow to Hamas now, all rocket fire on her citizens notwithstanding.

While what follows the Hosni Mubarak regime - likely in the next few years - is unpredictable regarding who will rise to power, it is almost certain that the next power in Egypt will be far friendlier to Hamas in Gaza, with whom it shares a critical border. This border is used for smuggling of all manner of items, but most importantly it is the chief entry point for advanced Iranian weapons, explosives and ammunition.

Egypt has ostensibly cooperated with Israel in patrolling the narrow Gaza border, though lucrative payoffs offered security forces and under-manning at times have created gaping holes in what is, on paper, an Egyptian sealing force. And the Egyptian government also refuses to support the Hamas offspring of its greatest internal challenger, the Muslim Brotherhood.

Potential Egyptian-Israeli Cooperation Standing Up Fatah In Gaza

Because a Fatah challenge to Hamas' iron-fisted rule in Gaza is in both Egypt's interest and Israel's, the two will likely cooperate in standing up a Fatah force in Gaza. It must be rebuilt from figurative and literal rubble following Hamas' bloody purge of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority. But if this can be accomplished, a Palestinian challenge to Hamas - and not an Israeli challenge - can be mounted. Again, the victory must be Palestinian and not purely Israeli for any view stretching past the next day, week or year.

With a sufficiently degraded and battered Hamas, Egypt could support a Fatah resurgence by permitting its supply and support through the Gaza-Egypt border, including the Rafah over-land crossing as well as through select tunnels currently peppered across the Philadelphi Route, a narrow strip of land. Just as Hamas needed its weapons and ammunition stores destroyed as much as possible, likewise the same must be built up and established for Fatah.

Reports indicate that Israel is considering re-taking the Philadelphi Route and holding it. This indicates Israel's commitment to clamp the tunnel smuggling routes beneath the east-to-west border corridor. It can destroy the tunnels as it detects them. But it may also be selective, as the key here is that Israel would essentially control them. It would maintain a presence above the smuggling tunnels with the ability to destroy them - or not - and also have the benefit of a co-interested Egyptian force at the Egyptian entrances.

Israel could permit the same through the border crossings with shipments entering Gaza from Israel. There was the counter-argument against supplying arms to Fatah, with the sober example of those same weapons now in the hands of Hamas terrorists being fired at IDF troops in Gaza. However, this reality is not present simply because Israel and the West assisted Fatah, but rather because Fatah - simply put - lost, and their weapons confiscated. The approach shouldn't be to not arm or support Fatah in Gaza. Rather, the approach should be to do so to the extent necessary that Fatah does not lose. The alternative is assured and continued Hamas domination and continued terrorist attacks with increasing range and lethality.

Both governments would likely substantially increase financial aid and support for Fatah if Israel can relatively assure the increase in financial support is meeting its intended Gaza project. The West would be approached to assist financially as well, with the effort presented as both relief and a Palestinian cause intended to establish an alternative to a terrorist-run quasi-government in torn Gaza.

Conclusion: Embracing The Long View

Israel has subtly utilized Fatah members in Gaza for ground intelligence throughout Operation Cast Lead, and to great affect. Fatah is willing to enlist Israeli aid in achieving its aims, which at current likewise include debilitating and dethroning Hamas. In the long view, this may be the type of allied support which builds both confidence and understanding going forward.

The face-to-face cooperation and coordination between Fatah members and IDF forces and Israeli intelligence required to net the effects it has thus far in Operation Cast Lead should not be dismissed out of hand or go unrecognized. This is very personal interaction and mutually beneficial cooperation among two sets of personnel that have been bitter, deadly enemies. And if Fatah and the Palestinian Authority can be resurrected in Gaza, it will have been through this cooperation. Working relationships and mutual respect is likely being established with each passing day. And perhaps, in quiet moments alone, a better understanding and appreciation one for the other.

This is not to say that flowers and chocolates at dinner together are in the immediate offing. However, it is from interpersonal seeds such as this that productive communications and relations down the road are built on as lieutenants become generals and ministers, and street activists and fighters become leaders.

In the short term, two profound tasks concerning the re-establishment of Fatah and the Palestinian Authority remain, presuming operations against Hamas continue to the point of significant degradation.

The first challenge is the physical supply, aid and restored manpower on the ground and in the streets and neighborhoods. Israel has at least some control over this challenge in keeping their end of the bargain.

The second challenge is one which neither Israel nor Fatah can control: Can Fatah be empowered significantly before Hosni Mubarak dies and the Egyptian regime encounters uncertainty and instability? (An assassination attempt on Mubarak's life in the coming weeks would not be a surprise.)

There are many risks for Israel going forward. But any action chosen contains risks. None of the options, however, contain the level of risk of continued inaction in the face of a building and strengthening Hamas in Gaza.

The clock may have been ticking in the heads of Israeli strategists and experts. Can Israel beat the clock? An untimely Mubarak death could unravel everything in short order if Egypt enters upheaval or if Mubarak's Muslim Brotherhood opposition gain rapid access to the levers of power. For Israel, within the additional crucial context of Hamas rocket attacks on Israeli civilians, the time to act was now. And it appears Israel had its eyes well down the road.

The approach Israel seems to be taking in Gaza today, unlike the 2006 Summer War with Hizballah in southern Lebanon, is one with a much longer view. It is a longer view than simply "punishing" Hamas or, as is popularly proffered in commentary, "punishing" the Palestinians writ large. It is a longer view that gives the appearance of guiding a potential Palestinian victory over a defeated Hamas in the Gaza Strip.

END NOTE: While the author does not pretend to be in the minds of Israeli strategic thinkers, the conclusion that Israel is taking the long-view approach to Gaza as suggested is based upon the observation of events in context with recent history and foreseeable future events, such as the inevitable eventual death of Hosni Mubarak and the challenges this will create. The conclusions offered in this space do not preclude, however, that such conditions can exist and yet see the often under-performing Olmert government fail to properly capitalize on them. Furthermore, if the aim of first degrading Hamas and then, with Egypt, standing Fatah to challenge Hamas on the ground and in the minds of the Palestinian people is not part of the Israeli strategic thinking behind Operation Cast Lead, the author suggests it should be.

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The primary immediate aim of the Israeli offensive on Hamas in the Gaza Strip is to halt, or more realistically, to reduce the rate of rocket attacks on the Israeli population. Hamas is the key terrorist agitator, thou certainly not the only one within Gaza, especially since seizing control of Gaza following its bloody purge of Fatah, and with it Palestinian Authority governance. Since that time, Hamas has bargained its way away from moderation and squarely into the Iranian terrorist orbit. It was at this point that the Hizballification of Hamas and its Gaza territory commenced full speed ahead, with Iran overseeing the arming, training and funding of significant Hamas weapons and tactics upgrades. This perilous reality dictates that Israel find a way to challenge Hamas within Gaza in order to ultimately defeat it. This is a long process that ideally includes Fatah as the primary challenger on the ground in Gaza.

Though there are significant risks for Israel in partnering with Mamoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) and the Fatah-led Palestinian Authority, the alternative is either a) direct, costly and prolonged Israeli operations inside Gaza; b) intermittent Israeli combat excursions against Hamas in Gaza with no end in sight; or c) continued disengagement, ceding to Hamas unmitigated and unchallenged terrorist buildup under the guiding eye of the Iranian mullah regime until it truly becomes Hizballah South (in a military/terrorist capabilities sense, not the theological or ideological sense.) And each of these options fails to achieve the elimination of rocket attacks on Israel's civilian population, increasingly at risk as the Iranian-supplied rockets improve and extend Hamas' reach deeper into Israel.

It is for these reasons, and the unpalatability of each of the above alternative approaches, that it might be wise to consider that what Israel is actually doing is preparing (softening, if you will) the future battlespace for a rejuvenated Fatah to ultimately rise and challenge Hamas for control of Gaza. Operation Cast Lead is not the operation that will 'defeat Hamas' or even stop the rocket fire into Israel. In fact, the latter cannot be achieved until the former is realized. Hamas is too entrenched and powerful in Gaza. It is also more than a collection of terrorists. It is a movement in every sense of the word, and one that has been part of the Gaza public identity and culture (media, education, etc.) for at least a generation.

The world seems to convulse whenever Israel shelves restraint and takes the offensive to the terrorist aggressors. There are no UN Security Council condemnations and demands for cessation of hostilities when Hamas rockets fly without Israeli response. But when Israel reacts to combat the combatants, the reaction and condemnation is swift and loud.

Israel can ignore such international political protestations, and is right to do so while acting in her own self-defense. But this is only possible for a finite period of time before international political pressure and condemnations begin to exact their toll on Israel - politically, economically, and militarily. This finite period of time - as seen in the 2006 Summer War with Hizballah terrorists in Lebanon - is never enough to destroy the teeth of a terrorist movement, only enough to impair it in the short term.

However, the reality is that if Fatah were to take up fighting Hamas for primacy in Gaza, the international community would hardly bat an eye. And, for Israel, the objective for securing its civilian population against incessant terrorist rocket attacks is the elimination of Hamas as the chief power broker inside Gaza. And if Israel will never be afforded the time and space necessary to do this and Fatah would be, then Israel - which at least works with Fatah in the West Bank, however imperfectly - likely sees the wisdom in assisting and empowering Fatah in achieving just that capability in Gaza.

This is no small order, mind you. Fatah was decimated by Gaza in the bloody internal fight for control of Gaza. Rebuilding them will undoubtedly be a greater challenge than the current phase of softening and bloodying Hamas. However, the overall restrained and relatively quiet response by more moderate Arab states in the region to the Israeli bombardment and ground incursion against Hamas in Gaza is a sign that they are not on board the Hamas bandwagon, even in the face of massive Israeli counter-attacks, and would support a Fatah resurgence. This support would likely be manifested in actual material support, which may already be in process.

The greater point here is that Israel's chief aim is the elimination of rocket attacks on its towns and cities from Gaza, which means necessarily that the chief aim is the elimination of Hamas' domination in Gaza. With one goes the other. Thus, Israel's greater goal in providing for the security of its civilian population is the elimination of Hamas, not necessarily the elimination of Hamas by the Israeli Defense Forces.

So if international political protest prevents the sustained Israeli operations necessary to significantly de-fang Hamas in Gaza, yet the world would not bat an eye at Fatah fighting to achieve the same ends, the logical strategic conclusion is to assist them in doing just that. Considering the longer view of things, this is exactly what Israel seems quite prepared to do. As your writer previously concluded in a brief look at the situation at The Tank on National Review Online, "There are two ways to fight Hamas. This, I believe, is Israel's preferred method."

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Open source intelligence (OSINT) is, for lack of a universally-accepted formal definition, information of value that you don't have to steal with spies or technical means. It can be free or you might have to pay for it but the thrust is that it is not classified or otherwise restricted by a government entity. To an extent we all use OSINT every day for any decision of substance; you identify a question that needs to be answered, you gather information that will help you make an informed decision, you process or analyze that information, and you make a decision based on the outcome of your analytic process. You don't need a spy or satellite to tell you which car to buy; in many cases a government doesn't need either of those tools to help it decide whether or not to take some kind of political action against an adversary. A simplistic comparison to be sure, but at the other end of the spectrum consider that all global business runs on OSINT, not secrets.

As a matter of fact, most of the information (later processed into intelligence) national and military decision-makers need to operate can be obtained via open sources (estimates range from 80%-90%), and the value of OSINT has been demonstrated numerous times over the last several years. Acknowledging these facts, this year's Office of the Director of National Intelligence OSINT Conference focused on the issue of the "decision advantage" OSINT can provide. While it was not an expressed target of the conference, there were numerous discussions about the role social network(ing) and related tech and practices could benefit the IC, something we can do for every -INT but given the related revolution taking place outside of SCIFs worldwide it made the conference a particularly apropos environment.

ThreatsWatch had the pleasure of discussing relevant issues with a number of current and former intelligence practitioners at this year's Open Source Intelligence Conference: Robert Stede, intelligence community analyst and technologist; Bob Gourley, former Chief Technology Officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency and currently CTO of Crucial Point LLC; Matt Burton, former analyst at the Defense Intelligence Agency and currently a consultant to the intelligence community; and Jack Holt, OSD Public Affairs.

TW: The promotion of OSINT as a peer –INT has been going on for some time now, though I don't think I'm going out on a limb when I say that earlier efforts have fallen short. Do you think what was said at this conference – combined with that you're seeing in the trenches - backs up the assertion that OSINT is finally coming into its own?

Robert: Is it coming into its own? It is and it isn't. OSINT's ubiquity is both a pro and con. It permeates everything in intelligence. If you take away the rules and customs of secrets, all you have left is OSINT, which is knowledge. Some diagram OSINT's role or place in intelligence as one of many circles in a Venn diagram; I see it as a cornerstone upon which the foundation of all intelligence is built. You can use the finest materials to build your house but if the construction is shoddy it's all for naught. Today, IC culture and expenditures drive us to buy fancy fixtures and molding, not invest in good architecture up front. The priorities of the Community are also backwards when it comes to sharing and collaboration. The tools and tech we use are serviceable; it's a rehab of our culture that needs to take place if we're going to deal with future mysteries and puzzles. We need to divorce ourselves from hierarchy and promote self-forming networks of trusted peers. Fears about reaching out to those who know better than you also has to be curtailed. Rewards for collaboration with peers inside and outside the wire need to be addressed if we ever want to know the truth. I don't expect this change to happen for a while; we are notoriously slow to understand and respond to emerging threats and concerns for our nation.

Jack: I believe OSINT is coming into its own primarily because the institutions that performed the function previously have been disbanded. USIA was a primary source of intel on cultures, norms, and attitudes in prior years and could give us an idea of who the thought leaders were on certain topics or areas. That information has not been readily available to an expeditionary force. OSINT has given us back that capability.

Matt: I'm not down in the trenches anymore, so I can't say. In my opinion, it would be best for open source intelligence if the term "OSINT" went away completely. The big reason it isn't a mainstay is because it's unclassified, and I think the OSINT label only highlights that when customers come across it. OSINT is not a separate INT. Rather, it comprises all the other INTs we normally use: photos, electronic, people...public satellite imagery is simply unclassified IMINT. Why call it something else that makes it look untrustworthy?

Bob: The nature of the world is changing. More and more is available in open sources. And with our IT systems we can bring the sum total of that to the desktop of our analysts. With social media we can apply more brains to racking and stacking and sorting. So you could argue that OSINT is of growing importance. But what OSINT could have told us that Putin was about to invade Georgia, or that he would mount a sophisticated deception effort to manipulate Western diplomats? Or that he would continue to say he will withdraw but had no intentions of doing so for weeks after the country was crushed? Could you argue that our newfound love affair with OSINT led us to believe we could know Putin's intent? Did OSINT contribute to yet another failure?

TW: We saw the senior representatives of a number of IC entities get up and talk about their OSINT efforts at a fairly meta-level. Not a day goes by and one of those entities (DHS) gets hammered by Congress for falling down on the job with regards to OSINT. With the benefits so obvious, why do you think it is so hard to turn vision into reality?

Robert: Attitude. The IC's attitude has not changed. If it's the first resort, shouldn't it be funded first?

Jack: I believe part of the problem comes from legacy thinking; the rest is people protecting their rice bowls.

Matt: I'm not familiar with the report, but it's probably a combination of things: execs being unwilling to be the first to take the leap, preferring that one of their peers do it first; middle managers who clog the flow of new ideas between desk workers and executives; and desk workers being stuck in their ways, unwilling and unable to learn a new business practice on their own.

TW: We heard a lot about "cognitive diversity" and the value that it can bring to analytic problems. Since OSINT is more or less tailor made for such an approach, how come there has not been a more significant outreach to SMEs outside the IC? We've done it in the past with classified works.

Robert: There's a fear of showing "our hand." We hear this stupid notion of the "Washington Post Test: If it can be ran in the Washington Post, it's bad." I think we need to be working with whomever, wherever them may be. And it was Dan Butler who said we need a little more humility to accomplish this. With a little more humility we can put our questions to a trusted network of groups, individuals, or machines. I would also argue that we could leverage our own citizens by just placing our puzzle pieces out there. We would be taking a large risk, but would feel that the return would be just as big. We have to face the reality that we cannot do this work alone and we have to grow into it.

Jack: Outreach to other SMEs will come more easily as we work through re-framing the environment to bring better understanding of the global information environment to the legacy thinkers. Example is how we've made a totem pole of "strategic communication" with no real understanding of what it is. SC is a process of identifying the strategically important publics for mission success and then finding a way to tell them what we're doing. That has a big IC component, an operational component, and a public affairs component. And, for example, if public affairs doesn't avail itself of the intel then the command is speaking without intelligence. We've seen and heard enough of that.

Matt: Haven't thought about this. A few possibilities: maybe it's a lot easier to get outsiders to help us when we have classified info to show them. Or maybe, because those outsiders already work with this OSINT day in and day out, there's no need to ask them for their input; it's already out there. Global Futures is the only such outreach effort I know of. Any others?

TW: Play king for a day; how would you re-align the current OSINT budget for your agency (or the community); what would you do with a 10% increase in funding?

Robert: More people with the right mindset; people for whom sharing is the default setting. If we all don't share or realize that we can't do it all, it's going to hurt our team. There are hundreds of people who wanted to be here in Analyst X's chair; if Analyst X is being introverted and unwilling to share what they know, that person is hurting far more than helping.

If I couldn't break the manpower ceiling I'd move to enable all of our data to be interoperable. There are two things that run concurrent through any information: space and time. Linking information by place would get us off and running in the right direction to integrate a multi-discipline community for multi-disciplinary problems.

Jack: More investment should be made in people. Collection and analysis is primary with training in the available products, processes, and the technologies available. Then investment in making the technologies shareable across the community.

Matt: Systems and training. Give the systems guys some of that budget and ask them to built a JWICS-to-Web port. We have to get the Web at the desk of every single analyst, and do it in a way that keeps them from having to switch machines. As long as the two networks are segregated, there will be a psychological barrier between "JWICS, where I do my work," and "The computer where I check my Gmail."

TW: If you had to draw a line in the National Intelligence Priorities Framework - stuff that would exclusively be handed over to OSINT practitioners outside the IC – where would it be drawn? If you could focus more OSINT on a given mission(s) which one(s) would they be?

Robert: I couldn't really say. You could throw them all over the fence if you wanted. They're just questions.

Jack: I see this as a complete package where someone gathers, another analyzes, another speaks, and the communication is whole. IC monitors and analyzes while PA discusses and puts back and every interaction changes the environment. To build to more understanding.

Matt: My first-hand experience in the various intelligence domains is limited. Bottom line though is that I'm sure they could all probably do with a healthy injection of more unclassified information.

TW: Best thing you heard an IC senior say? Worst/most disturbing/annoying?

Bob: Without a doubt, the best thing I heard any IC senior say was Glenn Gaffney stated he believes it to be our responsibility to field an infrastructure with the ability to enable IC users to mashup data. We owe this to today's analysts and tomorrow's; and we must build an infrastructure that will let tomorrow's users do things like mash up data in ways we might not even imagine. Seeing a senior IC leader articulate a vision on mashups really left me feeling like the community is in great hands.

As a runner up, I have to say it was Director Hayden's quoting of the great master of operational Intelligence Vince Fragromene. Vince was quoted as having taught Director Hayden that "if you live by SIGINT you die by SIGINT", meaning that you cannot simply trust any single source for an assessment. Vince and others drummed that lesson into my head as well, and I saw time and time again how important it is to seek every possible source that has information or context on a particular situation. It is also critically important to know the strengths and weaknesses of every source. For example, HUMINT might reveal intentions, but if a Human said it then it could also be a lie. ELINT might reveal a precise location but if a parameter is captured wrong it may totally mis-identify the radar that is there. SOSUS might actually be a bottom bounce hit and the Sub may actually be way far away vice close. Imagery might have been taken at the time the activity was over or may be taking pictures of fake targets. The lesson is, you must use every possible source and you must know its weakness. And the reason Director Hayden was telling us about Vince's lesson was it is even more important to OSINT. Just because it is said does not mean it is true.

Robert: "Here's some money. Go do this." Actually, I like Secretary Gates' speech last year discussing the need to have individuals like John Boyd. Boyd's mantra about choosing what to be is great. Either you go off to "be someone" or you "do something." We need more "do," because right now, we have a large "say-do" gap.

Jack: Everything Glenn Gaffney said was the best thing along with Gen. Hayden. I don't recall anything disturbing but that is probably because if disturbing statements are made then impact is being had.

Matt: The best thing was an astonishing policy opinion stated in private by a very senior person in the community; I'd rather not run the risk of upsetting him, but needless to say it was very positive. The worst thing was also said during a private conversation with another senior: In the context of FISA, wiretapping, telco immunity, etc: "These people share their lives online, then complain about invasion of privacy." This is disturbing in the context of the conference because it demonstrates a lack of awareness of how online communities work.

As one speaker at the conference noted, a lot of long-time intelligence practitioners doubt the value of OSINT and they chaff at the thought that freely available information is more valuable than secrets. More to the point, they consider any efforts to more effectively integrate freely available information into the intelligence business to be anathema and entertaining such change is a threat to national security. The threat however, is in not pursuing such a course of action, because it is abundantly clear that our adversaries - particularly non-state adversaries - are doing it and in many cases eating our lunch in the process. It was easy to dismiss al-Qaeda on 9/10/01; not so much the day after, and they managed their far-flug and clandestine operation without the trappings and "benefits" of our intelligence community. Making full use of OSINT is not simply a trendy thing to do, but a vital aspect of any effort designed to reboot the intelligence community. We appreciate your time and thank you for participating in this discussion.

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